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ABSTRACT  
FACTORS INFLUENCING HUMAN RELIABILITY OF HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS 
COOLED REACTOR OPERATION. Operator roles and intervene actions on the operation of gas 
cooled reactor would be different compared to their roles in other reactor types. Analysis of operator 
performance and the influencing factors can be conducted comprehensively in Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA). Using HRA, the impact of human errors on the system and the ways to reduce human 
error impact and frequency can be idenfified. The paper discusses factors influencing reactor operator 
performance to response to the cooling accident of the high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR). 
Analysis and qualification of influencing factors, which are performance shaping factors (PSF), were 
conducted based on time reliability curve and Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM). 
Based on time reliability curve, results showed that time variable contributes to the improvement of 
operator performance (PSF<1), especially when the safety features of the system properly work as in the 
design. Based on CREAM, it can be identified that in addition to the time variable, human machine 
interface design and sufficiently training also contribute to the improvement of operator performance. 
This study found that total PSF equals to 0.25, in which the positive dominant factor is time variable 
whose PSF is 0.01 and the negative dominant factors are procedure and working cycle whose PSF is 5. 
Those PSF values reflected the multiplier factors to the human error probability. The analysis of 
performance shaping factors should be developed on the other operation and accident scenarios of 
HTGRs prior to be further applied for a comprehensive assessment and analysis of human reliability and 
for the design of human machine interface system at control room.  
Keywords: PSF, HTGR, human operator, control room, human reliability  
ABSTRAK  
FAKTOR-FAKTOR YANG MEMPENGARUHI KEANDALAN MANUSIA PADA 
PENGOPERASIAN REAKTOR TEMPERATUR TINGGI BERPENDINGIN GAS. Peran dan 
tindakan operator pada reaktor berpendingin gas akan berbeda dengan peran operator pada operasi tipe 
reaktor lain. Analisis unjuk kerja operator dan faktor yang berpengaruh dapat dilakukan secara 
komprehensif melalui analisis keandalan manusia(HRA). Melalui HRA dampak dari kesalahan manusia 
pada sistem maupun cara untuk mengurangi dampak dan frekuensi kesalahan dapat diketahui. Makalah 
membahas faktor yang berpengaruh pada tindakan operator, yaitu pada kejadian kecelakaan pendingin 
reaktor gas bersuhu tinggi-HTGR. Analisis untuk kualifikasi faktor pembentuk kinerja(PSF) dilakukan 
berdasarkan kurva keandalan fungsi waktu, dan metode keandalan manusia yang dikembangkan 
berdasar pada aspek kognitif yaitu Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM). Hasil 
analisis berdasar kurva keandalan fungsi waktu menunjukkan komponen waktu berkontribusi positif pada 
peningkatan keandalan operator (PSF<1) pada kondisi semua fitur keselamatan berfungsi sesuai 
rancangan. Sedangkan pada metoda analisis dengan pendekatan kognitif CREAM diketahui selain faktor 
ketersediaan waktu, faktor pelatihan dan rancangan HMI juga berkontribusi meningkatkan keandalan 
operator. Faktor pembentuk kinerja keseluruhan diketahui sebesar 0,25 dengan faktor kontribusi positif 
dominan atau berpengaruh pada penurunan kesalahan manusia adalah ketersediaan waktu (PSF=0,01), 
dan faktor kontribusi negatif dominan adalah prosedur dan siklus kerja (PSF=5). Nilai PSF tersebut 
sebagai faktor pengali dalam perhitungan probabilitas kesalahan manusia. Analisis faktor pembentuk 
kinerja perlu dikembangkan pada skenario kejadian lain untuk selanjutnya digunakan untuk perhitungan 
dan analisis keandalan manusia yang komprehensif dan perancangan sistem interaksi manusia mesin di 
ruang kendali.  
Kata kunci: PSF, HTGR, operator, ruang kendali, keandalan manusia 
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Design of new reactor type such as high temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) has been 
much improved and has a higher level in safety. This reactor type has passive safety systems that 
do not much depend on engineered system. Consequently, the reactor operation and accident 
management of HTGR becomes simpler compared to those of other reactor designs such as PWR.  
Moreover, operator roles and other factors influencing the performance of operational actions can 
also be reduced by implementing inherent control system and automation.  Therefore, the 
possibility of decreasing on operator performance and vigilance affected by the high automation 
system, inherent control and regulation, and minimum intervention in the reactor operation 
becomes a concern of many researches [1,2].  
In contrast to the engine or components of a nuclear installation, human factors tend to be 
complex, and their performances are also influenced by various factors. Analysis on human 
performances and influencing factors are implemented in various industrial areas, especially 
industries that have a high hazard potential, such as nuclear reactors, chemical industry, oil and gas 
industry, as well as the transport and aviation industry [3-5]. Therefore, the researches for assessing 
human performance shaping factors on human reliability analysis are developed, such as during 
reactor operation in control room, conducting maintenance activities, and determining operation 
risk scale as well [6-8]. 
In new-generation reactors, such as HTGRs where the safety systems have been designed 
much better than the previous generation, human factor approach is used to optimize the  
performance of safety functions, and to improve the effectiveness of reactor operation. Information 
on factors that influences performance shaping factors (PSF) are essential as a basis in attaining a 
good reactor design and safety operation. With this regard, determining the level of automation, 
human-machine function allocation, design of auxiliary systems, and other significant aspects can 
be made more precise through task analysis and comprehensive consideration on human factor [9-
10]. 
There are many PSF variables, which should be considered in the analysis of human 
reliability. Up to this time, there are no standards and provisons which specify how the most ideal 
number of PSF or should be used in HRA [8,11]. Some methods even use only one variable of PSF 
in the analysis, but there are a number of methods that consider more than fifty PSFs on their 
analytical approach. The number of PSF used does not linearly correspond to valid analysis results. 
In this study, according to operator actions applied as a response to the accident, the availability of 
time is considered as one of important element in the PSF. Some other PSF components to be 
considered are the adequacy of the training, the availability of plans and procedures, the adequacy 
of HMI and operation equipment, the number of targets to be achieved, the quality of the 
cooperation of personnel, and working conditions [6,12,13].  
In HTGR operation, the time availability is well considered through the design of safety 
systems that do not require the operator to take immediate actions for off-normal situations. This is 
quite different from other reactors such as PWR where the response to the accident conditions tend 
to be required immediately. However, from the human factors perspective, there are many factors 
that should be considered in order to minimize human error probability, other than the time 
availability. Therefore, factors contribute to the operator performance in HTGR operation and how 
those factors influence operator error probability need to be evaluated. The purpose of this study is 
to analyse and quantify the performance shaping factors of human reliability in the HTGR 
operation. A cooling accident in HTGR was used as a case study. Two methods are applied in the 
methodology, i.e. human reliability analysis as a function of time (single PSF) and Cognitive 
Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM), which include multiple PSFs. Qualification and 
quantification of the influencing factors applied in SPAR-H method was adopted for conducting the 
analysis of PSF or common performance condition (CPC) in CREAM through the comparison of 
the equality amongst variables of these methods [6,14,15]. The results of this study could be 
combined with other reactor operation scenarios for achieving more comprehensive human 
reliability analysis of HTGRs. 
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HTGR Primary Cooling System 
Gas cooled reactors such as HTGR have specific characteristics and features designed with a 
high safety level. Passive system and inherent safety systems applied in the design, as well as the 
absence of the possibility of the reactor melt become the attractive features. Moreover safety is also 
improved through the availability of sufficient time if the necessary operator action are required 
during an accident or emergency conditions. For some advanced reactor designs or categorized as 
generation four, reactors are designed to achieve safe conditions by itself without required short 
time intervention of operator.  In HTGR design, the reserve shutdown system and safe shutdown 
cooling systems are required to be manually actuated by operator when the outer control rod trip 
system fails. However during the accident, maximum temperature of HTGR fuel will not exceed 
1620 oC and it can be achieved after several days [16]. Some studies showed that the operator 
actions in response to the cooling accident tend to be required after approximately 24 hours [16,17]. 
In the case of new generation of nuclear plant such as HTGR, reducing the acquiring for 
short term intervention by operator in mitigating the accidents or abnormal events can be realized 
through the implementation of inherent safety features in the design. However, it should be 
considered that the problems of the human factor in nuclear reactor operations is not limited to the 
availability of time for taking appropriate actions/responses. Other factors need to be considered in 
conducting reactor operations such as the adequacy of procedures and tools, operator understanding 
to the system, communication among personnel in the control room etc. These factors can also 
affect the success of operation performed. During the accident operator is also assigned to monitor 
environmental parameters such as exposure of radioactive and pressure change in the reactor 
building. In addition, there are some nuclear accident experiences, which show the importance of 
the human role outside the control room [18,19]. 
The leakage or loss of coolant in the HTGR primary system can be initiated by the break of 
primary coolant circulation pipe, a leakage in the pipe system of the steam generator, or a failure of 
the valve. This accident causes the malfunction of heat transfer through the reactor primary coolant 
reactor and temperature increase. However, the increase will not exceed the specified limit of 
maximum fuel temperature. Reactor will automatically scram since the initiating signal is activated, 
and the temperature will go down by itself due to the use of a passive heat removal system in the 
design[16]. Moreover the transfer of heat from the core is also accommodated through the reactor 
cavity cooling system (RCCS).  Sample diagram of HTGR primary system components are 
presented in Figure 1[20]. 
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Fig. 1. Primary System of HTGR [21]. 
Human Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) 
In a qualitative analysis of human reliability, PSF is used to identify all factors contributing 
and influencing human/operator reliability. Whereas, in the quantitative analysis, PSF is used to 
calculate the probability of human failure. As shown in equation 1[11], if components of PSF have 
a positive impact, they will reduce human erro probability (HEP) and, hence, the value of PSF will 
be smaller than 1 (0< PSF <1. Inversely, if components of PSF have a negative impact, they will 
increase HEP and, hence, the value of PSF will be greater than 1 (PSF > 1). Therefore, the value of 




( 1 ) 
 
The stage for qualifying the human error in the reactor operation can be classified as the 
process of identification the likelihood of error and tendency, and contributing factors to the 
incidence. This identification process should be performed comprehensively in order to determine 
the factors that influence to the process entirety. During the identification stage, screening of the 
influencing factors are conducted through selection based on the contribution value of those factors. 
The influence factors are then considered further based on the likelihood of the operator error and 
its trend. Each of PSF components are assessed with considering on the available and necessary 
information for determining its effect on operator performance.  
There is a categorization model on the determining PSF to be used in the identification 
process. The model which is based on Nureg CR1278 [4] split the PSF as external factors, internal 
factors and stressors. External factors include all aspects outside the human operator such as 
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working environment, tool and equipment. The internal factors are related to the operator mental 
and competence and other operator features, and  stressor is related to all aspects that affect the 
physical and psychological workload of operators. In simple terms, the process of taking action by 
an operator can be separated into two stages that are the process / stage of diagnosis and execution 
stage. The curve of human reliability in the diagnosis as a function of time is given in Figure 2 [4]. 
Nominal curve shows the failure probability in diagnosis during the abnormal occurrence that is 
known by the operator or have already acquired in the training. 
 
Fig. 2. Human reliability curve on the diagnostic as a function of  time [4]. 
Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysisis Method (CREAM)  
In the human reliability analysis, categorization of operator error in response to the 
accidents/incidents or taking remedial actions are determined as C category which then can be 
distinguished as errors in diagnosis and errors in execution [8,11]. Up to this time, many human 
reliability analysis methods were developed. Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method 
(CREAM) aims to include the cognitive processes that occur in the construction of operator actions 
more systematically in the calculation of human reliability. Human action is considered not only as 
a single act sequential execution but also as a integrated activities performed to achieve the target 
that is constantly changing as a function of time and processes that experienced. Therefore, actions 
priority can be changed according to the conditions and targets. In the CREAM, influential aspects 
considered in the analysis includes the technical aspect, and aspect related to human and 
organizational factors. In this approach, the time has influence on two things: the first is the 
flexibility to evaluate the incidence, develop an action plan and take an action. The second thing is 
the process of change that occurs in the system,and updating the information of the changes[6,21]. 
The combination simultaneously to both of these as a function of time will determine the process of 
identification of events/situations, decisions and actions are correct. The contextual control model 
of CREAM comprises of three main concepts that are competence, control and construction. 
There are nine factors called common performance conditions (CPC) as the performance 
shaping factors in CREAM. Those factors are the adequacy of training, availability of plans and 
procedures, the adequacy of human machine interface (HMI), availability of time, the number of  
simultaneously target, the quality of cooperation , organizational factors, environmental conditions 
and the work cycle as shown in Figure 3[22]. In the quantification of human/operator error 
probability, the task analysis is required in order to identify the operator actions and activities, 
including the common performance conditions that affect to the probability of human error. The 
determination is based on the analysis result to define the factors  that contribute to human error, 
namely, positive contribution (factors reducing the error probability), negative contribution (factors 
increasing the probability of error ), and did not have a significant impact to the error probability( 
nominal ).  
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The Standardized Plant Analysis Risk - Human Reliability Analysis (SPAR-H) 
Another method called the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk - Human Reliability Analysis 
(SPAR-H) also includes the cognitive aspect into its consideration. There are eight PSFs applied in 
SPAR-H those are experience/training, procedures, ergonomics, availability of time, complexity, 
work processes, stressor, the suitability of the task [14]. The method was developed as a simple-to-
use approach for risk analysts to compute HEPs. For example, the multiplier factor for the 
condition with no procedure available equal to 50, on the other hand if the procedure completed 
with a systematic structure, the multiplier factor is 0.5. The multiplier factor of PSF in the activity 
of operators during the diagnostic process and action implementation process is tend to be similar. 
Qualification for the multiplier factor of performance shaping factors for each conditions is 
elaborated in the NUREG CR 6883 document. Completeness of information and data from each 
PSF conditions will affect to the determination and qualification process.  
 
Fig. 3. CPCs in CREAM and the dependencies [22]. 
METHODOLOGY  
Analysis of the performance shaping factor of  HTGR is conducted based on the operator 
task in controlling heat removal during the leakage of primary coolant accident scenario. The 
process includes identifying factors influencing the operator response during the accident. 
Characteristics of HTGR operation and control features on accident conditions are used as a basis 
in determining the PSF. The method for defining the influence and contribution of PSF are based 
on human reliability curve as a function of time (HRC) and CREAM analysis method which is 
based on cognitive approach. In this case, time availability is considered as a single PSF and the 
human reliability curve is used to determine the PSF value. On the other hand, the implementation 
of CREAM for defining the values of PSFs’ set components consists of the following steps. The 
first step is to identify the relevant common performance conditions (CPC) in the colling accident. 
The second step is aimed at identifying the elements or subitems of CPC based on the PSF 
taxonomy in the accident conditions. The final step is to quantify those influenced factors in 
CREAM based on the CPC and its conformance to the factor element in SPAR-H method as given 
in NUREG CR-6883. For this purpose cognitive process or diagnosis stage is assumed as a 
dominant factor rather than execution stage. Collected data and information regarding operation 
scenarios, system conditions and operator will be used as a basis in determining the contribution of 
coresponding influential factors on the operator error probability. The subjective judgement is 
applied in the process based on the description of the context in the analysis.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
During the leakage of HTGR coolant, it can be identified that the time availibility for 
conducting diagnosis and action is much greater than the required time (expansive time). In this 
case, operator action related to cognitive aspect such as diagnosis and determining an appropriate 
action need more time than for executing the action. However, if all safety features work properly 
as in the design, based on the previous data studies, operator is not required to intervene or  take 
any action during at least within the 24 hours, since the inherent safety and systems features, such 
as RCCS will dissipate the heat and then cool the reactor. It can be assumed that during this period 
operator will be able to recognize the availability of the safety features in response to the accident 
and take appropriate actions before the reactor goes to recriticality or core temperature exceeds the 
safety limit, in case the safety features do not work. 
The operating organization and the control room are also well designed in HTGR. Moreover 
the cooling accident is classified as common accident scenario that should be included in the 
operator training material. It means that the human operators can be considered as high competence 
and hence they have complete understanding on the accident scenario described in the training. 
From the human reliability curve as presented in Fig. 2, it can be determined the operator failure 
probability during 100 to 1000 minutes is between 1x10-4 and 1x10-5. The human error probability 
after 24 hours would be much less than 1x10-5. Therefore, based on the task processing stage as 
applied in SPAR-H model it can be determined that multiplier factor of PSF approximately equal to 
0.001, which can be found by dividing the human error probability of HRC with the nominal 
diagnosis error probability (1x10-5 /0.01). The result indicates that time availability in anticipation 
of primary cooling accident of HTGR has positive contribution in reducing operator error 
probability especially in the diagnosis process (PSF<1). If the design of safety features do not work 
then the value of this contribution will decline because of reducing time availability. 
Analysis of the cognitive approach in CREAM does not treat the operator acts as a series of 
single actions which has fixed objectives and priorities. Objectives and priorities are more 
determined by a process that would change any time. Accordingly, the performance shaping factors 
are not merely influenced by time variable, but also the conditions during the process. Therefore, all 
CPCs of CREAM are identified as relevant PSF to the operator actions in the operator response 
during the cooling accident. 
Identification of the elements for each CPC was conducted based on the PSF taxonomy and 
characteristics of operator action in response to the accident. The analysis of conditions and 
features in HTGR design which are relevant to the CPCs are perfomed based on the available 
collected design information and operation requirement. The elements of CPC and the associated 
conditions in the HTGR design are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. CPC and corresponding conditions in HTGR design 
No CREAM-CPC  Elements Conditions in HTGR Design 
1 Adequacy of training and 
preparation 
Training program ,simulator, 
Operator skill and experience 
Effective training program, 
simulator based training system, 
exploited new technology/modern 
tools in control room design, high 
criteria and qualified operator 
2 Availability of 
procedures, planning 
Availability, format or type, 
logic structure, clarity of 
instruction 
completeness and accessibility of 
procedure, not sufficient reactor 
operating experience.  
3 Adequacy of HMI 
(Human Machine 
Interface) and operational 
support 
Information availability, 
workstation, control display 
design, alarm system, 
usability 
Advance HMI design and support 
system, error tolerance, high 
usability, clearly and mature 
information, computerized based 
procedure  
4 Available time Available time vs require time Minimize operator intervene, expand 
time for taking actions.  
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No CREAM-CPC  Elements Conditions in HTGR Design 
5 Number of simultaneous 
goals 
Priority among tasks/ goals, 
number of goals, operation 
charateristics 
Multi functions, complex operator 
task,  simultaneous goals, 
moderately complex. 
6 Crew collaboration 
quality 
Clearness in role and 
responsibility,communication, 
trust level 
Appropriate communication system, 
management of task and authority,  
 
7 Adequacy of organization Plant policy, structure control 
room personel, safety 
management system 
Well established organization,  
Appropriate task distribution and 
personel management 
8 Working conditions physical working 
environment, Stress/stressors,  
Appropriate and adjustable physical 
working environment, Multiple units 
and interconnections process in a 
reactor site. 
9 Working cycle/time of 
day 
Staffing, work load, fitness 
for duty 
Reducing control room crew, 
declining operator redundancy, 
Operator shift transfer. 
 
Interactions of operator with the reactor system are mainly conducted in the control room. In 
the modern control room design operator error during the task execution can be substantially 
reduced or anticipated by the implementation of error tolerance and error correction (error 
recovery) on the design. Particularly in the design of human machine interface components, such as 
information presentation and control input device. Thus, in the advanced control room design such 
as HTGR control room, it can be considered that the operator errors tend to be more exists in 
cognitive process rather than execution process.  
The analysis result of the common performance conditions  in CREAM and the relationship 
with the factors in SPAR-H are given in Table 3. Method for qualification of multiplier factor of 
performance shaping factors is provided in the NUREG CR 6883 document. From those results as 
presented in the Table 3, it can be obtained that the total multiplier factors of PSF equal to 0.25. 
Performance shaping factors that contribute to the increasing of operator error probability are the 
completeness of the procedure, the duty cycle, and the working environment. On the contrary PSFs 
which contribute in reducing the operator error probability are the adequacy of training, adequacy 
of HMI and support system, as well as the availability of time. Availability of time become the 
dominant factor in reducing the multiplier factor of PSF, that equal to 0.01. The expansive time of 
CPC component resulted the probability of operator error in conducting diagnosis is 1x10-4. 
Table 3.  Analysis result on PSF and multiplier factors 
No CREAM-CPC  SPAR-H-PSF Level/quality HEP(Multiplier 
factors) 
1 Adequacy of training and 
preparation 
Training/Experience Good/High 0.005(0.5) 
2 Availability of procedures, 
planning 
Procedure Available, but poor 0.05(5) 
3 Adequacy of HMI (Human 
Machine Interface) and 
operational support 
Ergonomics/HMI Good/Appropriate 0.005(0.5) 
4 Available time Available time Expansive time 10-4(0.01) 
5 Number of simultaneous 
goals 
Complexity/stressor Moderately complex 0.02(2) 
6 Crew collaboration quality Work processes Nominal 0.01(1) 
7 Adequacy of organization Work processes Nominal 0.01(1) 
8 Working conditions Stress/stressors High 0.02(2) 
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CONCLUSION   
There are some factors contribute to the reactor operator reliability of HTGR. Identification 
of the factors influencing human reliability during primary coolant accident of HTGR showed that 
a time availability is a main contribution in reducing the probability of operator error, especially 
when the safety features for heat conversion/dissipation system work properly as in the design. 
HTGR safety system design affected the time required for operator to diagnose and to take 
anticipatory action are much smaller than the available time(expansive time). From the analysis 
method using reliability curve, it was found that a multiplier factor of PSF equal to 0.001 (PSF <1). 
However, the result of the study also identify that in addition to the available time other PSFs are 
also essential. The cognitive-based method CREAM indicated a multiplier factor for a time variable 
and overall PSF are 0.01 and 0.25 respectively. Influenced factors with positive contribution to the 
operator reliability are the adequacy of training, adequacy of HMI and supports, and availability of 
time. On the contrary the negative contribution is resulted from the completeness of the procedure, 
the duty cycle and the working environment.  
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